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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE SOCIOLOGY OF MORAL JUDGMENT:
SOCIAL AND ETHNIC FACTORS*
Anthony J. Cortese
Colorado State University
Social and ethnic differences in moral judgment are examined and a
critique of the cognitive-developmental model is presented in this
article. In opposition to Piaget and Kohlberg, the thesis advanced
here is that morality and moral development are culturally and
socially determined constructs. While Piaget postulated the presence
of qualitatively distinct stages of moral development to be found in
all societies, the position presented here is that the number ofstages,
the content of the stages, and the order of the stages varies across
cultures. While Kohlberg asserts that morality is located in the psy-
chological structures of the individual, our position is that moral
reasoning and behavior is largely determined by such social factors as
role demands, class interests, national policies and ethnic antago-
nisms. Moreover, one cannot be moral in an immoral social role
irrespective of childhood socialization, psychological predispositions
or commitment to abstract principles.
Piaget (1952) viewed cognitive development as consisting of a
sequence of stages, .proposing the stages to be universal and invariant.
Social transmission (e.g., culture, family) was considered a key variable
in the rate of development according to Piaget'searly writings. Piaget
contended that an individual's intellectual· development was largely the
consequence of social factors, such as language (Piaget, .1926) and
parental and peer support and constraint (Piaget, 1965). But while the
content of development was socially determined, the structure was not.
Piaget's emphasis on structure is evident in his study of moral
development (1965). He focused on the application and the conscious-
ness of game rules in order to generate moral stages from behavior
patterns he observed in children. Piager's 'method was to play marbles
*The author gratefully acknowledges T.R. Young for his helpful comments on this
paper.
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with the children of Geneva. In response to his probing questions (e.g.,
"Who makes the rules?" or "Can you change the rules ?"), the children
explained the rules as they played. Piaget concluded that younger
children were seen to be objective in their moral judgments; that is,
they judged an act to be right or wrong solely in terms of the relation
of the act to the rule. Older children, however, were seen to be subjec-
tive in their moral judgments; that is, they took the intentions of a
person into account when judging the moral rightness or wrongness of
an act.
These two responses represent two basic levels of moral develop-
ment, heteronorny and autonomy (Piaget, 1965). Unilateral respect for
parents or other authorities and the rules they prescribe is characteristic
of heteronomous morality (morality shaped by others). Mutual respect
for peers or equals and a rational respect for rules that guide in teraction
are characteristic of autonomous morality. Thus, it is the nature of
social relations and eventually societal complexity that structures the
type of moral reasoning found in individuals. From Piaget's early stance
it follows that morality is to be discovered more in the structure of
society than it is in the structure of human cognition. Later, however,
he altered his position, negating the significance of social factors but
emphasizing action as the basis for cognition (Piaget, 1952, 1954).
Two features of Piaget's approach have become standard for'
Kohlberg's structural view of moral development (Edwards, 1981: 503).
These include: (1) a method, the flexible clinical in terview, which
allows the tester considerable freedom to probe the "whys" 'of the
subject's belief to uncover the underlying level of structure; and (2) a
theory about causal transition from one stage to the next, that social
experience stimulates development by encouraging processes of role-
taking (the. coordination of perspectives of self and others as a basis for.
choosing) .
Kohlberg's investigations begin with confronting an individual
with stories that pose a moral dilemma, many of which set up opposi-
tion between a law (or norm) and a human need. The dilemmas encour-
age respondents to answer on the basis of their cognitive maps regarding
morality. Kohlberg's moral dilemmas present a conflict such that a
particular response is clearly not the only conceivable one that is
acceptable. The conflict may center around the need for a choice
between two culturally unacceptable (or acceptable) alternatives. While
the substantive response the subject makes is irrelevant, what is of con-
cern is the type of reasoning she or he uses in deciding how to resolve
the conflict.
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Kohlberg (1969, 1971) proposes that there are six possible stages
of moral development:
a three-level progression from an egocentric understanding of fair-
ness based on individual need (stages one and two), to a conception
of fairness anchored in the shared conventions of societal agreement
(stages three and four), and finally to a principled understanding of
fairness that rests on the free-standing logic of equality and reci-
procity (stages five and six). (cf. Gilligan, 1982:27)
He asserts that these six stages form a universally invariant sequence in
full accord with all the requirements of stage theories (Kohlberg, 1969:
348-349,352-252; Piaget, 1960).
CRITIQUE OF COGNITIVE-DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY
Cross-national research suggests that the rate and terminus of
moral development is highly variable from one cultural setting to
another. Individuals in highly industrialized settings are reported to
move through the lower stages at a more rapid rate and to achieve
higher stages than do individuals in less industrialized and less urban
settings. Cultural complexity is salient since greater societal complexity
is linked to higher stages of moral development (Edwards, 1975).
Schweder (1982), Simpson (1971), Sullivan (1977), Gilligan (1977,
1982), Gilligan and Murphy (1979), and Murphy and Gilligan (1980)
have critiqued Kohlberg's theory and its accompanying method as basi-
cally impaired and biased. We now turn to examine these critiques in
detail.
Sullivan (1977) views Kohlberg's theory as liberal" ideology
r?oted in .ce.rtain ~ocio-historical conditions. This includes the suppo~i­
~IO~ ~hat It .IS an Ideal that humans are rational, a focus on justice and
individual rights, and a. commitment to the concept of social contract.
Stage six reasoning is parochial vis-a-vis a universal objective for "moral"
persons. Kohlberg's framework assumes a deducible, fair and just
society. Consequently, it is unable to consider injustice in a contempo-
rary society (this is discussed later). Sullivan also draws from the ideas
of Marx, Engels, and Lukacs in criticizing Kohlberg's stance of "abstract
formalism." The focus on form comes from the form-content distinc-
tion central to structural stage psychology (Kohlberg, in press). When
formalism is applied to ethics, righ tness is a matter of the universal
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form of the principle followed. According to Kohlberg's metaethical
assumption of formalism, an ethical stance can be agreed upon in pre-
scribing moral structure without reaching consensus on the substance of
ethical values.
Sullivan sees Kohlberg's position on formalism as conservative
ideology supporting the status quo. Kohlberg's views involve an uncon-
scious "defense of exploitation" while being theoretically based on
notions of individual rights, justice, and human freedom. In dichoto-
mizing form and content, cognition and behavior, Sullivan argues that
Kohlberg erroneously equates the more complex and abstract with the
more right and moral. Sullivan, (and as we shall see later in Gilligan),
suggests that there is a lack of affect, emotion, moral sensitivity and
imagination in Kohlberg's framework. In sum, Sullivan points to the
incompleteness of a structural theory of moral development and the
bias of an ideology rooted in Western culture. Kohlberg's use of false
dichotomies results in an alienated and "morally blind" perspective of
persons as moral agents.
Simpson (1974), like Sullivan, disputes Kohlberg's stages as
culturally universal. There is a dearth of postconventional (stages five
and six) scores in non-western, underdeveloped, and rural cultures. If
postconventional reasoning is found more prevalendy in urban cultures
that are Western influenced, then it follows that Kohlberg's invariant
stage sequence, particularly the conceptualization and operationaliza-
tion of the highest stages, is culturally biased and ethnocentric.
Simpson argues against the claim of cultural universality on philo-
sophical and empirical grounds. Empirically, there is a lack of post-
conventional reasoning outhe prot.o~o.ls. of individuals in some third-
world cultures. Moreover, regression has been found in some cultures
and even in some of the American subjects in the longitudinal study by
Colby et al. (1983). Finally, Simpson finds the measures to be method-
ologically problematic. The scarcity or absence of postconventional
reasoning in some cultures may not mirror actual disparity in moral
judgment. Instead, it reflects differences that occur due to a lack of
understanding of the background of subjects. Thus, the researcher
needs to be more sensitive to the conditions that affect performance
during the Moral Judgment Interview.
Simpson used three examples to illustrate this final argument.
First, the scoring of a subject as postconventional may not represent
the presence of underlying stage structure but may only be a reflection
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?f linguistic sophisticati?n. The concepts expressed by stage five sub-
jeers depend on such a hIg~ level of abstraction that would automatical-
l~ exclude most p~ople (Including American adults). Next, the moral
chle~mas are used m a constraining interview format and may not be a
familIar or relevant context to gauge moral thinking Fi all 0 0 0
o I al 0 • In y, msensrnv-
Ity to cu tur meanIng on the part of the interviehi' 4" wer, scorer or
researc er cou d result m the misinterpretation or devaluation of
responses from other cultures. The scoring manual needs t bd d . I d . ex-?a~ e to I~C u ~ I~ igenous examples of reasoning at higher stages if~. 1S to aV~)1d mISsmg or misinterpreting the reasoning of culturally
iverse subJ~cts (K~hlber~,Snarey, and Reimer, in press).
d I As with Sullivan, Sunpson indicates that a research based scale of
ev~ opment cann~t be applied objectively or universally since it is a
poro uct o.f ~ certam cultural background at a particular point in time
(It~ genesIS In m~dern Western society and ideology). Simpson also
objects t~ the claim of universality on the basis that it provides th
?PP'i:"tumty for making.invidious comparisons between cultures. Tha~
~~' t e stage s~q~?nce implies a scale for grading some cultures as
mor~ly sup~rlor and others as "morally deficient." Develo menttheo~sts use infant mortality rates, education, income equality ;ender
equality, and caloric intake as non-psychological tests of de I'
One should use both. ve opment.
Schweder (1982) also criticizes the claim of universality in
Kohlberg's per~~e~tive. He asserts that morality is historically and
culturally relativistic, Schweder opines that moral stand ds rnizh blik 1 d 0 ar s mtg t e
e anguage an food; different across cultures but equal. He borrows
fro~ MacIntyre (198~) to attack the assumption of rationalism of
Ko be:g.. Attempts ~Ince the Enlightenment to develop a rational
u~derp1!1m.ng for a ull1vers~: objective ethic have been constructed out
~ ~Jn-rat10nal presupposlt~ons, premises which any rational person
ou reasonably deny. Rational foundation turns out to be the soft
~~nd of preferred (a~d often shared) assumptions. At its confines, moral
iscourse becomes Ideology, a deceptive type of "mock rationality."
£ Schweder asserts that Kohlberg is unable to separate content and
?r~. .Further, contrary to Kohlberg's theory, there is no formal
similarity ~f ~oral reasoning at the postconventional stages. Kohlber 's
conceptualization of justice is a form of liberal ideology, faithfulle~dorsed by secular humanists but not required by reason or fact. Lik~
SImpson, Schweder feels that the data base of the theory is weak (.
the dearth of st fi . " 1.e.,age rve or SIX reasonIng In non-western societies).
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Finally, he argues that the data do not support the Piagetian assump-
tions of invariant stage sequence and structural wholeness. Cortese (In
review) has found horizontal decalage (internal inconsistency in moral
judgment) in his research in which the structured whole hypothesis is
tested.
Gilligan (1982) provides a "sweeping critique of all major devel-
opmental theories on the grounds that they are biased against women"
(Colby and Damon, 1983:474). She attacks Freud, Piaget, and
Kohlberg for defining morality as justice. Kohlberg's theory was based
upon his all-male sample. Moreover, theoretical revision has been
derived from the longitudinal analysis of that sample (e.g., Colby et al.,
1983). Longitudinal analysis of data on females did not occur until
1969. Theoretically, if women do not participate in society's secondary
institutions (through education and work responsibility), then they are
not likely to acquire those role-taking abilities necessary for the pro.-
gression to higher stage reasoning as defined by Kohlberg (1969).
Kohlberg (in press) acknowledges the importance of an orienta-
tion of care, connectedness, and responsibility in moral reasoning. He
also admits that the scoring manual does not lead to a complete assess-
ment of this orientation. Gilligan suggests that this type of moral
reasoning is predominantly used by females, while males tend to use a
rights or justice orientation. She concludes that Kohlberg's framework
(especially the postconventional level) "reflects a limited western male
perspective and may therefore be biased against women and other
groups whose moral perspectives are somewhat different" (1982:36).
Murphy and Gilligan (1980) and Gilligan and Murphy (1979)
have found regression in prescriptive reasoning about justice in early
adulthood (using the standard dilemmas) . Conversely, they discovered
developmental progression on real-life dilemmas. The responsibility
dimension is seen as more context-relevant than the justice orientation.
In opposition to Kohlberg's abstract moral principles, Gilligan and
Murphy believe that the more mature mode of thinking relies on con-
textually relative perceptions of the factual moral situation and its
psychological consequences. The postconventional morality of justice
is conceptualized as an adolescent type of overly-theoretical and overly-
abstract moral perception that potentially transforms into a contextual-
ly relative morality in adulthood.
Kohlberg's stage six focuses on logical comprehensiveness that
promotes autonomy rather than connectedness and sets up moral di-
lemmas as 'mathematical equations rather than judgment, wisdom, and
]14
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transcendental creativity. The logic of abstract reasoning, however, falls
apart in the context of a real-life dilemma. That is, the application of
clear-cut moral guidelines are irrelevant in the face of multi-dimensional
personal crises. Thus, relativism results from actual experiences of con-
tradictions in conflicts between abstract moral principles and the
factual complexities and ambiguities of real-life situations. Whereas the
primacy of reason and the conception of the moral ideal is stressed by
Kohlberg, an alternate view is to center on the diversity and disorder of
experience, the possibility that life itself is unfair. The point is not to
ignore reason but to transcend it.
While the works of Piaget and Kohlberg are of monumental im-
portance in reflecting on moral judgment and upon moral behavior,
there is a major flaw in the body of their works. The assertion of six
and only six stages (Kohlberg, 1969) with one and only one final,
mature mode of moral judgment preempts all other moral systems for
all time. An alternate view is that each social or ethnic group constructs
a sequence of moral development and a mode of moral judgment appro-
priate to its own circumstances which are neither morally superior nor
morally inferior to the cognitive-developmental model. Rather, they
simply are different in that diverse social ends are sought. An examina-
tion of some of the research on ethnicity and social class as it relates to
various aspects of human development is important in this regard.
ETHNIC BACKGROUND AND SOCIAL CLASS
Human social and cognitive development is largely an outcome of
the child-rearing practices of the cultural subgroups .which make up a
modern complex society (Havighurst, 1976:56). Social class groups and
ethnic groups (people who have a common past history and generally
share ways of life including language; religion, and social identity) in-
fluence individuals through the same mechanisms: family activity, peer
group, linguistic concepts, common literature, work in formal associa-
tions, in-group marriage and segregation. The social classes are among
the most pervasive and powerful in their influence (Gordon, 1964:52;
Havighurst, 1976:56). However, ethnic groups are also effective, more
so at the lower-working-class level than at the upper-middle-class level.
There has been a primary controversy over the relative significance
of race and socioeconomic status. In The Declining Significance of Race,
William Wilson (1978) charged that economic class now is a more
salient factor than race in determining life chances for blacks. Charles
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Vert Willie (1979), in Tne Caste and Class Controversy, provided a
direct rebuttal to Wilson. Willie argued that Wilson's work is part of a
series of publications (e.g., Jencks et al., 1972; U.S. Labor Department,
1965) that obscures the focal point of the freedom movement among
racial/ethnic minorities. The significance of race is increasing, Willie
maintains, especially for middle-class blacks who, because of integration
programs (e.g., school desegregation and affirmative action) "are
coming into contact with whites for the first time for extended action"
(1979:157). While conceding positive opportunities through desegrega-
tion, there are also new opportunities for prejudice and discrimination
that have not existed under conditions of segregation.
The case for the basic importance of social class in socialization is
based largely on the proposition that early child-rearing practices and
resources are fundamental and these vary with social class (e.g. Kohn,
1963). Bernstein (1964) has attempted to show that basic cognitive
structures, language styles, and value orientations which children absorb
within the family may be expected to vary with ethnicity as well as
social class. Johnson and Sanday (1971) found striking differences
between blacks and Anglos at low income levels concerning value
themes. Blacks were lower on 'trust in people,' 'future orientation' and
'individual responsibility for poverty.'
Comparisons of blacks and other minorities with Anglos at
middle-class levels have not revealed significant differences. For ex-
ample, in a study of moral judgment in Chicano, black and white young
adults, no significant differences among ethnic categories were found
(Cortese, in press). Subjects were college students, typically from
middle-class backgrounds. This means that ethnicity is less powerful in
the middle class than in the classes below it. Why? In the process of
social mobility, the-formerly lower-class" people who are now mobile
have tended to move into the 'mainstream' of economic life and thus
acquired an upper-middle-class lifestyle while losing some of their
ethnic characteristics. This seems to be true of blacks and people of
Spanish origin:
black and Spanish ethnicity do not seem to correlate well with
upper-middle-class life style, arid therefore they have less influence
on the behavior of middle-class blacks and Americans of Spanish
origin, though they are relatively stronger than social class influences
among the lower-working class. (Havighurst, 1976:62)
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However, an analysis of social mobility of Chicanos in Southern Califor-
nia (Penalosa and McDonagh, 1966) indicates that upwardly mobile
Chicanos do not shed their ethnic identification significantly. Thus, it
seems to be the shedding of lower-class culture rather than erhnicity
which is most related with upward mobility. Lack of opportunity may
delay or preclude development of certain "social skills." This leads us
to how differential socialization relates to moral judgment.
Bartz and Levine (1978:414) found that Chicano parents were
similar to blacks in that both expected their children to assume earlier
responsibility for their behavior than did Anglos. But a.lthough Chicano
parents expect early autonomy, the father's decision appear to be non-
negotiable. This pattern engenders unilateral respect in children. Conse-
quently, the process toward autonomous morality is impeded.
To be sure, the Chicano has been influenced by the technological
and cultural context variables peculiar to the United States, yet retains
the core values of Mexican folk culture and rejects the basic aspects of
the dominant value system (.Hayden, 1966:19). Murillo (1971:99)
states: "Latin values are more closely adhered to than is common in the
Anglo culture." Perhaps the availability of recognizable guidelines pro-
vides more emotional security and sense of belonging to its members
(Ulibarri, 1966). A moral judgment scale for Chicanos must respond to
a Chicano value orientation which strongly emphasizes interpersonal
relations rather than individual rights, abstract principles, law and
order, or self-chosen principles.
One can conclude from the various critiques of Kohlberg dis-
cussed earlier that the structures of moral reasoning used by Western
middle to upper-middle class white males appear to be taken as the
ideal type for everyone. Similarly, the norm of the dominant people is
taken as the model for the entire society.
Moynihan provides such an example in his report on the black
family. He suggested that the slow rate of progress by blacks resulted
from an alleged matriarchal family structure which is "so out of line
with the rest of American society" (U..S. Department of Labor, 1965:
29). Implicit in that statement is the assertion that if black families
were made over in the image of white families, they might be treated
like whites (Willie, 1983). Jensen provides another example in regard
to intelligence: "The remedy deemed logical for children who would do
poorly in school is to boost their IQ's up to where they can perform
like the majority" (Jensen, 1969:3). The implication is lucid once
1]7
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again. If black children would think like white children, then black chil-
dren would be treated like white children. Kohlberg, like Moynihan and
Jensen, does not appear to consider that how ethnic and lower-class
groups reason morally may be how they should be, given their existen-
tial condition.
There are at least two ideal types-those of the dominants and
the subdominants (Willie, 1983). Both contribute to the structure and
process of social organization since culture is a composite of ideal
types. The norms and contributions of neither may be ignored. For ex-
ample, the insertion of large numbers of black women into the labor
force set a precedent for an increasing number of white women being
employed outside the horne. In 1900, approximately four out of every
10 black women were members of the labor force, a proportion far
greater than that for whites (Feagin, 1967:23). The large ratio of
black women who work outside the home relative to white women has
been often considered as an overrepresentation. But if black women
have been overrepresented in the labor force, then white women clearly
have been underrepresented (Willie, 1983).
Young (1980) argues that in mass society the structure of in ter-
action which results in the development of the self is bureaucratically
organized. This is contrary to the position of Kohlberg where societal
complexity results in an autonomously moral self. Interaction in
bureaucracy and other formal organizations, Young continues, is so
brief, impersonal, and narrowly focused that the development of a self-
system is difficult. Inasmuch as regulations, commands, and job des-
criptions mediate behavior in bureaucratically organized societies, the
development of. a morally c.onscious self. is superfluous .. Young warns
that as personal and societal disorganization increases, it becomes more
pressing to evaluate the current state of social psychology, point out its
weaknesses, and construct more accurate models of self and society:
A society moving toward more fragmented and predatory forms of
self needs this self-knowledge more than it needs an army; more than
it needs au tomobiles, more than it needs nuclear based energy and
more than it needs Monday Night Football. (1980: 1)
It follows that the structure of a class, elitist society needs to be
eliminated before an autonomous self is possible.
Morality depends upon more than personal judgment. If behavior
is mediated by ways, orders, company policy, or advertising psychology,
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then the concept of the autonomous moral self presented in Kohlberg
and others is a myth. When one sells one's labor power to a factory,
retail firn1, insurance company, energy enterprise, or presidential
administration and re-election campaign, one sells in the same moment
one's moral character however developed it might be (Candee, 1975).
In the act of taking wages, one subordinates oneself to the logics of the
firm. One must produce what one is: hired to produce whether it be
dangerous drugs, chemicals, or energy. One must sell on the terms set
by the firm using the sales approach selected by higher authority.
Whether those terms are just or' those ads are sexist is not a matter of
moral judgment for the clerk. In the same fashion, an immoral foreign
policy is not subject to individual moral judgment (T.R. Young, per-
sonal communication, August, 1984). Kohlberg's theory is faulty
because it represents a model of moral development unconcerned with
the relations in the larger society. It assumes equal access to secondary
institutions and collective, democratic discourse in policy formation.
Participation in societal institutions and problem-solving and
role-playing experiences are necessary for an individual to develop a
mature mode of moral judgment. In many instances, lower-class people
and ethnic minorities are locked out of this process by dominant
groups. Alienation on a macro scale is likely to occur. The rejection of
one class of persons by another is not an individual phenomenon.
Lower-class people and ethnic minorities either deal with or withdraw
from a society that ignores them, is indifferent to their presence, or is
intolerant of their participation. Alienated people often fail to adopt
the substantive values and related moral stances of society because they
are' severed from participating in secondary institu tions during their
socialization.
The power to implement innovations is the main distinction be-
tween whites and ethnic minorities (Willie, 1983). The choice that is
unique for dominants is whether to make the system available to subor-
dinates so that all can profit from existing resources. Ideally, no one
should gain or lose because of one's arbitrary placement in social strati-
fication. Justice would mean the compensation for disadvantages. How-
ever, the exclusive system has not been transformed to an inclusive one
since this would entail sharing one's power, privilege, and prerogative.
Kohlberg's highest stage (six) does address this issue because it is
defined as "self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical compre-
hensiveness, universality, and consistency" (Kohlberg, 1971:165). It
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cannot handle the injustice of real life-and that a fundamental premise
of human reasoning is self-interest.
DISCUSSION
Throughout the history of moral philosophy, culturally universal
standards of ethics have been debated. Such attempts have been intrigu-
ing although vigorously criticized given the substantial variation of
value configurations and related moral stances across time and from one
cultural setting to the next. There has been a recent emphasis on human
righ ts in the academic and political arenas. The notion of human rights
appears to imply a hierarchy of ethical standards adequate for moral
judging. One must first determine whether, at a basic level, the concept
of morality has the same meaning for all cultures. Most, if not all, lan-
guages include a word or term which carries the general connotation of
morality, duty toward others, To be sure, how cultural systems define
individual and group responsibilities and rights vary tremendously. Yet
our actions seem to reflect at least a vague coordination of other and
self perspectives. '
Let us return to the issue of varying cognitive styles in moral
judgment. Several key questions should be addressed: "What are the
social conditions under which a morally competent self system arises,
what are the obstacles to self-other dialectics, and how may these
obstacles be surmounted?" (Young, 1978:2). Young adds that such
questions assume that the structure of the self is variable, requiring a
supportive social matrix if it is to develop a social self, Without which it
may notdevelop at all.. _. ,
The socialization process in the U.S., according to Young, is not
geared to the production of specific social identities for young persons,
but rather is oriented to the inculcation of skills and techniques which
are sellable on the labor market. Stage theory reflects a similar scientific
bias. Principled reasoning centers around those technical skills necessary
to design and control rational-purposive systems, i.e., systems organized
to replace the idiographic world of normative human beings with the
nomothetic world of the predictable and the externally controllable.
Moral stage theory, which sets this mode of judgment high in the scale
of moral development, may be more of a political act espousing modern
corporate success for individuals.
The concept of surplus population in capital-intensive production
refers to people who are not needed and who do not have the resources
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to buy the forms of life and leisure identified on mass media as neces-
sary to the "good life" (Young, 1978:6-7). Blacks and Chicanos are
more likely to be found in the surplus population and are denied those
identities central to the productive process. Morality, as part of ideo-
logical culture, is not produced by situated, interacting individuals as
presumed in cognitive-developmental theory. Rather it is mass pro-
duced via the bureaucratic organization, the media, and a technicized
science. Ideological culture is produced largely by a political elite and
material culture is produced largely by technology. Consequently,
people in the surplus population are excluded from meaningful inter-
action with each other (and from the construction of secondary social
institutions and social knowledge). Hence, the culturally universal
assumption of the cognitive-developmental framework does not seem to
hold. "Without jobs or income, the material base with which to pro-
duce a social life world in concert with a stable set of relevant and
significant others is difficult" (Young, 1978:7). One cannot makejudg-
ments to obey property laws when one must satisfy physical needs or is
lead to satisfy false needs.
Cognitive-developmental theory and symbolic interactionism do
not place an adequate emphasis on how relationships of the means of
production relate to the development and exercise of self. Relations of
production are crucial for an understanding and evaluation of the struc-
ture of self (including moral development), consciousness and culture.
The dialectical relationship between self and the systems of production
holds the potential for understanding the oppressive character of the
relations of production. People forced into menial work by the struc-
t,ure ~of race, class; or g.~nderprivilege may have low self-esteem and
this, in turn, may subvert self-control, self-determination and a view of
oneself as a moral agent.
Kohlberg's assumptions seem to be representative of a general
bias in American social psychology that: "the self is an autonomous,
creating, active even determining part of the process by which social
reality itself is produced" (Young, 1978: 1). Ethnic disparity in moral
judgment represents a bias built into the definition of stages (Edwards,
1981:511-512). Accordingly, such differentiation is also accounted for
by a lack of assessment of the relations between, for example, Chicanos
and blacks and the systems of production.
There are several possibilities that m~st be considered (Cortese,
in press). First, ethnic groups have different moral structures, and each
mode of reasoning is meaningful for its particular existential situation.
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Charles Zastrow and Lee Bowker, Social Problems: Issues and Solu-
tions, Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1984. 604 pp. $24.95 (cloth).
In this review, four criteria will be employed to evaluate this new
text: the overall organization of sections and chapters, readability and
presentation, its introduction to the nature and study of social prob-
lems, and the quality of the substantive chapters.
Overall organization. One of the difficulties .zeachers of social
problems courses inevitably encounter is that of organizing a series of
substantive topics into a sequence that makes sense to students.
Students should be able to discern that topics are related and not
merely a sequence of unrelated problems. And, though many of these
problems lend themselves to multi-disciplinary treatment, students
should be able to identify a unique sociological perspective (this latter
concern will be less of an issue when the social problems course serves
programs in addition to sociology, such as social work or human
services). Unfortunately, this text fails on both counts.
Zastrow and Bowker's text contains a single-chapter introductory
section ("The Sociology of Social Problems"}: with substantive topics
organized in three parts. Part 1, "Individual Problems," .contains
chapters on crime and delinquency, emotional and behavioral problems,
drug abuse, family, human sexuality, and aging. Part 2, "Inequality
Problems," includes racial issues, sex roles and sexism, and poverty.
Part 3 "Global Problems," covers health, violence, urban problems, big
business and big government, work, and population and the environ-
ment.
Instructors who take pains to emphasize the difference between
personal and social problems may be dismayed by the title given to
Part 1 as well as by the problems considered "individual." The subse-
quent treatment of these problems, it should be noted, does not reflect
this characterization and thus the chapters can be assigned in other
sequences without creating, or contributing to, any confusion.
Readability. This book is quite well written and uses a minimal
amount of sociological jargon (a glossary of terms is included as well).
The "boxes" in which illustrative material is excerpted or paraphrased
from well known works are placed in sufficient context to be profitably
read by students taking their first sociology course. In giving examples,
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